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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Need for Progress in an Era of 
Transformation: South African Professional 
Military Education and Military Effectiveness
Abel Esterhuyse* and Benjamin Mokoena†
The article explores the link between defence sector reform, military effective-
ness, and education. During the post-1994 transition, defence sector reform 
in South Africa primarily involved the ‘transformation’ of the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF). The transformation of the military, though, was 
 predominantly driven by the notion of racial representation with little emphasis 
on  embedding military effectiveness as a central element of the transformation 
effort. While, education was recognised as a key element in the transformation of 
the military, the emphasis was on the programmes of the National War and Defence 
Colleges in Pretoria, targeting senior military officers. However, the accreditation 
of these institutional programmes through alignment with civilian universities was 
problematic and has forced the military to critically evaluate the pathway for the 
development of its officer corps. The evolving approach of the SANDF towards 
military education provides a useful case study to highlight the importance of a 
long-term view of military effectiveness, underpinned by a committed and edu-
cated officer corps, as a central component of defence reform initiatives.
Introduction
Defence sector reform, according to the 
United Nations policy on the topic, describes 
a national process that intends “to reconcile, 
reform, transform, restructure, reengineer 
[sic], enhance or develop an effective, effi-
cient, accountable and affordable defence” 
(UN 2011:16). The defence sector is defined 
in an inclusive manner as “the civil-military 
structures, and personnel responsible for 
the protection of the sovereignty of a State 
and its peoples while meeting the State’s 
obligations to contribute to international 
peace and security” (UN 2011:16). These 
 civil-military structures include, amongst 
others, those responsible for education and 
research in civil society. As a process that 
is characterised by multidimensional and 
multi-layered complexity, defence sector 
reform, is highly dependable on education 
as a process and a tool to reconcile, reform, 
transform, restructure, reengineer, enhance 
or develop an effective, efficient, account-
able and affordable defence. Since 1994, 
the process of defence sector reform in 
South Africa was discussed and operational-
ised under the notion of the transformation 
of the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) and the Secretariat of Defence.
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The overarching challenge of transform-
ing defence policy and the armed forces 
in the context of the Constitution, the 
national security and economic realities of 
the  country, and international law on armed 
conflict, is addressed in the first chapter of 
the first White Paper on Defence published 
in a democratic South Africa in 1996. The 
need for transformation is defined in terms 
of: the history of the armed forces in South 
Africa; the changing strategic environment 
at the international, regional and domestic 
levels; and, most importantly, the advent of 
democracy. The process of transformation, it 
is noted, will be guided by the principle of 
defence in a democracy (DOD 1996). As a 
result, the word transformation appears 75 
times in the 1998 Defence Review.
Approach and Methodology
The aim of this article is to contextualise the 
utility of higher education in the SANDF 
since democratisation in 1994 with specific 
reference to the National War and Defence 
Colleges in Pretoria.1 The first part of the 
 article considers the importance of the inter-
play between transformation, education and 
the idea of military effectiveness. The second 
section demarcates the need for education in 
the SANDF, and the third part considers the 
ability of other educational institutions to 
address this need. The last part of the article 
highlights challenges facing the education of 
the military in South Africa.
The research question informing this 
 discussion concerns the key factors 
 constraining the delivery of higher educa-
tion at the war and defence colleges of the 
SANDF. From a methodological perspective, 
the first part of the article relies on second-
ary sources and a literature review. The sec-
ond part of the article is based primarily on 
the observations of the authors in the design 
and delivery of programmes at the war and 
defence colleges of the SANDF. As a result, 
some may consider the discussion to be 
somewhat anecdotal. However, the authors 
supplemented their views with informal and 
confidential interviews with other profes-
sionals involved in programme delivery at 
the war and defence colleges. The authors 
would like to thank those involved in these 
informal interviews for their reading and 
constructive feedback on earlier drafts of 
this article.
A Word on Military Transformation, 
Effectiveness, and Education
Much has been written about the need for, 
and the drivers and impact of, transforma-
tion in the South African armed forces after 
democratisation in 1994 (Heinecken 1998; 
Kahn & Louw 2013; Uys 1997; Winkates 
2000). From a practical perspective, some 
academics view South African armed 
forces as suffering from transformation 
fatigue (Cilliers 1998). More specifically, 
however, the armed forces face military 
 effectiveness challenges because of how 
the transformation processes have unfolded 
over the last 20 years.2 The process of trans-
formation has had many important dimen-
sions. The initial debate that unfolded was 
about the appropriate role and nature of the 
military within a democratised South Africa 
(Williams 2002). This issue became one of 
the cornerstones of the 1996 White Paper 
on Defence (DOD 1996) and the subsequent 
Defence Review published in 1998. With 
the 1998 Defence in a Democracy, higher 
education was positioned as an important 
mechanism to facilitate transformation and 
address the issue of military effectiveness 
(Department of Defence 2015: Chapter 11).
Despite the early good intentions and the 
early successes of the integration process, 
the SANDF and defence establishment in 
South Africa soon had to confront the con-
troversy of the so-called Strategic Defence 
Package – a controversial arms deal under-
taken by the South African government. 
Tainted by questions of corruption, the arms 
deal has become a primary focal point in 
 post-apartheid corruption scandals and has 
led to questions about the alignment of the 
newly procured equipment with the opera-
tional needs of the SANDF (Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development 
2016). The defence package focused primar-
ily on modernising the air capacity of the Air 
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Force and the surface ships and submarines 
to the Navy. In contrast, the security debate 
of the 1990s, with human security as the pri-
mary construct, informed future visions for 
the South African armed forces that placed a 
high priority on involvement in peacekeep-
ing efforts in Africa (Ferreira & Henk 2009). 
Such efforts would not only be expeditionary 
in nature, depending primarily on the Army, 
but would have to rely heavily on the Air 
Force to provide tactical and strategic airlift.
The most important outcome of the arms 
deal, however, was not the misalignment 
between missions and capabilities within the 
military. The most important outcome was in 
the unfolding of a growing civil-military gap, 
with the public increasingly mistrusting the 
military, and both the public and National 
Treasury becoming very sceptical about 
the need for an expanding defence budget 
(Heinecken 2005). Domestically, the mili-
tary’s image was tarnished, and its budget 
was under pressure. Practically, deploy-
ments into Africa, kept the SANDF out of the 
public eye. However, most media report-
ing on military affairs seemed to be nega-
tive. As a result, the debate on and focus 
of military transformation in South Africa 
became institutionally-driven efforts focus-
ing on racial representation. It is interesting, 
for example, to observe how the  military 
reports to the  parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Defence during the 2000s 
focused almost exclusively on personnel 
racial  representation percentages (Parth & 
Schneide 2017; Piombo 2012). As a result, 
by 2006, the demographic and cultural 
 transformation goals, as outlined in the 1998 
Defence Review, had largely been achieved. 
However, the transformation of the military 
in terms its professionalism and effective-
ness goals have been less successful. Not only 
has the utilisation and implementation of 
higher education to enhance military effec-
tiveness, remained largely unrealised, more 
specifically, it has become a major challenge.
The internal emphasis on demographics, 
instead of military effectiveness and institu-
tional culture, as the primary driver of defence 
transformation, was increasingly reflected in 
the challenges facing South Africa in peace 
mission deployments in Africa (see Mandrup 
2008). Through its involvement in peace-
keeping, the SANDF became an important 
element of South Africa’s  foreign policy. 
However, it soon became clear that the South 
African armed forces face a variety of disci-
plinary and other challenges in conducting 
and sustaining these missions (Anon 2001; 
De Carvalho and Nganje 2016). The prob-
lems facing the South African military in 
the projection of force in peace missions in 
Africa culminated with the disastrous ‘Battle 
of Bangui’ that left 15 South African soldiers 
dead after a two-day battle with rebels in the 
Central African Republic.
Various critical vulnerabilities  affecting 
the effectiveness of the South African 
armed forces were exposed in Bangui. These 
included, amongst others, the lack of a strate-
gic airlift capacity, inadequate command and 
control, and a lack of logistical, medical, air 
and intelligence support. Two observations 
can be made about the impact and aftermath 
of the Battle of Bangui (Vreÿ and Esterhuyse 
2016): the first is the lack of public interest 
in what the South African military is doing 
in Africa. There was no real outcry from the 
public about the death of its soldiers in a 
mission for which the government could not 
provide a legitimate explanation without 
generating speculation and media attention 
about the personal economic interests of the 
South African President and his associates 
(Mandrup 2016). The second is the culture 
of denial and abjuration that became visible 
within the SANDF and the unwillingness of 
the SANDF to do an open, transparent and 
thorough in-depth after-action analysis of 
events in the CAR and to engage in open 
and transparent debate with academia and 
broader society about what transpired and 
what went wrong.3
If military effectiveness was only based 
on the results and outcomes of combat, 
the challenges would be relatively easy to 
solve through training. Training is a group-
driven activity that develops the  leadership 
and sociological factors of effectiveness 
– cohesion, group solidarity, small-unit 
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leadership, Kameradschaft – and non-mate-
rial factors such as esprit de corps, staying 
power, and will-to-fight. The emphasis is on 
 doctrines and tactical and weapon systems 
and their proper utilisation on the battlefield 
(Millett, Murray and Watman 1988:1–2). 
Training is a key element of the answer to the 
complexity of organisational effectiveness 
within the military context. However, the 
integration, skill, quality and responsiveness 
of both the vertical and horizontal dimen-
sions of military institutions are the essence 
of many of the numerous, simultaneous, and 
interdependent tasks that armed forces must 
do at different levels of military effectiveness 
to perform with proficiency.
Education, and the theoretical foundation 
thereof, underpins military effectiveness in 
two fundamental ways. Firstly, education is 
explanatory in that it contributes towards 
increased knowledge and understanding of 
war and warfare. However, war is a practical 
business. Therefore, education is, secondly, 
normative since it constitutes guidance 
as to how war should be waged and won. 
Thus, education addresses military effec-
tiveness from both a theoretical and practi-
cal perspective (Angstrom and Widen 2015; 
Van Creveld 2017). Writing on the utility of 
theory, Carl Von Clausewitz has profound 
insight that can be applied to the utility 
of higher  education: education can “cast a 
steady light on all phenomena so that we 
can more easily recognise and eliminate the 
weeds that always spring from ignorance; 
it should show how one thing is related to 
another, and keep the important and the 
unimportant separate. [Education] cannot 
equip the mind with formulas for solving 
problems, nor can it mark the path on which 
the sole solution is supposed to lie by plant-
ing a hedge of principles on either side. But it 
can give the mind insight into the great mass 
of phenomena and their relationships, then 
leave [the mind] free to rise into the higher 
realms of action” (Clausewitz 1976:578).
The practical challenge – and reality 
of higher education that confronted the 
SANDF – is that, though soldiers have a 
natural inclination to training, the military 
cannot  educate on its own. Military educa-
tion must be done in co-operation with the 
general, non-military, scholarly community; 
especially, in cases such as the SANDF, where 
an in-house higher educational capacity has 
not been developed over time. Two factors 
then come into play and have a direct impact 
on decision-making about education in the 
SANDF: firstly, the military must relinquish 
some control of the education process to 
academics; and, secondly, education is not 
only inherently expensive, but also naturally 
discriminatory in terms of access, exit criteria 
and requirements. These two critical  factors 
underpinned many of the key challenges 
confronting the SANDF in its search for path-
ways to educate its personnel, particularly its 
officer corps.
The Demand: Drivers of the 
Educational Needs in the South 
African Military
Two factors shaped the debate on the role of 
higher education in the development of the 
SANDF in the post-1994 period: firstly, the 
focus was primarily on the role of the Military 
Academy and the Faculty of Military Science 
of Stellenbosch University in Saldanha 
Bay, Western Cape; and, secondly, that the 
military provided nominal and inapt input 
into the debate. The debate was primarily 
informed by the views and opinions of the 
academics at the Military Academy, the man-
agement cadre of Stellenbosch University, 
and academics and think-tanks from out-
side the military domain (Esterhuyse 2007: 
229). The Institute of Defence Policy, now 
the Institute for Security Studies, played a 
key role in the unfolding of the debate. The 
debate, to a large extent, culminated in a 
1995 conference on military education at 
the Military Academy in Saldanha and the 
publication shortly thereafter of the 1996 
White Paper on Defence.
The 1996 White Paper on Defence 
addressed training and education as part 
of a chapter on civil-military relations. The 
 positioning is insightful and a reflection of 
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how the authors of the document viewed 
the role of education in the armed forces. 
The White Paper does not clearly distinguish 
between education and training and treat 
them, essentially, as a singular entity. As such, 
education (and training) are seen, firstly, as 
essential “in developing the political and eth-
ical dimensions of military professionalism” 
(DOD 1996), and secondly, education must 
play a key role in the “implementation of a 
civic education programme on ‘defence in a 
democracy’ to instil respect amongst military 
personnel and other members of the DOD 
for the core values of a democratic South 
Africa” (DOD 1996). The idea of ‘defence in a 
democracy’ is seen as a key element in “reori-
entating [sic] tertiary level education and the 
Military Academy” (DOD 1996: par. 38). The 
Military Academy is the only training and 
educational institution that is mentioned by 
name in the document.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
debate on education within the SANDF 
not only turned inwards, but it also shifted 
towards the role of the two senior learn-
ing institutions in the development of 
higher-ranking officers. Though the Military 
Academy in Saldanha remained the key role 
player in the delivery of a broad liberal edu-
cation to entry level young officers of the 
SANDF, the National Defence College and 
the newly created National War College, 
both in Pretoria, came to be the cornerstone 
institutions for education in the SANDF and 
for the preparation of its senior leadership 
cadre. The War College came into being to 
address the need for jointness in the SANDF 
and the need to develop operational com-
manders for campaign planning and orches-
tration. The War College, with its emphasis 
on the operational level of war, found itself 
on the interesting borderline between train-
ing and education. It became the quintes-
sential institution for qualifying military 
practitioners for promotion to colonel. The 
Defence College, in contrast, developed 
its so-called Executive National Security 
Programme (ENSP) as a truly educational pro-
gramme with the idea of human security as 
the primary design concept. It was designed 
for attendance by senior colonels for promo-
tion to general rank.
It will not be wrong to argue that the ENSP 
at the Defence College was an outstand-
ing, highly regarded and well-respected 
 programme. It relied on systems think-
ing as the basis for the analysis of South 
African and global security. The directing 
staff at the Defence College played a key 
role in  organising a wide range of national 
and international experts from both the aca-
demic fraternity and broader South African 
society as guest speakers. The extensive and 
highly impressive guest speaker programme 
was supplemented with visits to and brief-
ings by a range of institutions in South Africa 
and abroad. The programme was aligned 
with the strategic needs of the SANDF and 
the country. The SANDF, often through the 
directing staff at the Defence College, had 
direct control over the presentation of the 
programme and, specifically, who attended 
and what was presented. The programme 
was well-attended by members from the 
defence industry, related security sector 
institutions like the police, intelligence and 
prison services, as well as senior foreign 
 military personnel.
The programme, however, had two key 
challenges. Firstly, by placing the emphasis 
on security, in general, and human security, 
particularly, as the design concept for the 
ENSP, a gap was created in the education, 
training and development process of senior 
officers in the SANDF. From the War College 
with its emphasis on campaign planning and 
the operational level of war, the emphasis 
shifted to national and human security at the 
Defence College. From a scholarly perspec-
tive, it is possible to argue that the SANDF 
shifted the focus from military  studies at 
the War College to security studies at the 
Defence College. In the process, defence 
and strategic studies were written out of the 
 curriculum of the SANDF’s senior officer 
corps development. Thus, the notions of 
defence, strategy and war, disappeared from 
the educational curriculum of the SANDF; 
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there was no defence in the programme at 
the Defence College! Over time the inability 
of officers in the SANDF to think strategically 
and analytically about defence and war – not 
security – became quite noticeable.
Four key arguments underpin the necessity 
to maintain a focus on strategic and defence 
studies in times of peace (Betts 1997:7–9). 
Firstly, militaries obviously ought to have 
the expertise in case conflict arises. Secondly, 
defence and strategic studies ought to inform 
debates about the role of military power in 
situations where less vital interests are being 
threatened. In other words, defence and stra-
tegic knowledge is required for informed 
debates about the secondary role of the 
armed forces and their  employment in situa-
tions short of war. The need for an informed 
debate about the employment of the SANDF 
in peace missions, border protection, envi-
ronmental security and the fight against 
crime are the essence of this argument; the 
debate, however, declined because of the 
loss of knowledge on these issues within 
South African defence establishment. Thirdly, 
defence and strategic studies ought to ensure 
political and military logic in the debate about 
the defence budget. This became a critical 
matter in the debate about defence in South 
Africa with the SANDF increasingly at a lost 
to explain their motivations and contextuali-
sation of the defence budget (Martin 2017a 
and 2017b). Lastly, and this is a vital issue for 
the post-1994 democratic South African soci-
ety, a debate on defence and strategic issues 
are critical for civil-military relations. The 
elite in South African society increasingly dis-
tance themselves from the military. Few poli-
ticians and policy-makers have experience 
in military service and the increased profes-
sionalisation of the armed forces has under-
pinned their growth and development apart 
from society. The civil-military gap in South 
Africa became an  interesting point of discus-
sion amongst defence academics with many 
South Africans instead opting to serve in for-
eign armed forces like Britain and Australia.
Secondly, another key challenge of the 
ENSP, and eventually the key reason why the 
Defence College opted to terminate the ENSP, 
is that the programme was not accredited at 
the South African Qualifications Authority 
(SAQA) and the Higher Education Quality 
Committee (HEQC).4 Although the ENSP 
was an outstanding and well-regarded pro-
gramme that was strategically aligned with 
the needs of the SANDF and the nature of 
its personnel, accreditation was the one 
criteria that it did not adhere to; the one 
box that it could not tick. Accreditation 
was so important for the SANDF that it 
decided to terminate the programme 
and rather entered negotiations with 
 universities in South Africa to present the 
 programme through an accredited higher 
education institution.
Ultimately, there were many factors, 
 outside of the focus and the accreditation 
of the ENSP, that contributed to the deci-
sion to terminate the programme. Firstly, 
it is  important to view the drive towards 
 accredited military education in South Africa 
against the background of the increased 
bureaucratisation and massification of 
both the military profession and higher 
 education occurring in the world and, par-
ticularly, in Africa (MacGregor 2017). The 
global trends towards bureaucratisation 
and technocratic management of armed 
forces, led to an exponential growth in mili-
tary middle management and a substantial 
increase in the number of staff colleges and 
 institutions of higher military training and 
education.5 These realities were augmented 
more recently with a significant increase in 
the complexity of the operational domain – 
from the battlespace to military institutions 
and adversarial actors (Flowers 2004; Liddy 
2004). This growth in the complexity of mili-
tary institutions and the environment they 
are deploying into is increasingly driving the 
need for knowledge and the search for attrib-
utes associated with higher education. These 
realities were augmented in the SANDF with 
the need for transformation. However, the 
efficacy of the SANDF’s efforts were ques-
tionable as the attendance of courses was not 
necessarily linked to a specific career path or 
an up-or-out principle in the  management 
of personnel. As a result, there was no clear 
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 criteria for meritocratic access to specific 
senior courses.
Secondly, since 1994 South African 
 military personnel have been exposed to a 
wide variety of foreign professional military 
educational institutions – from peer institu-
tions in many African countries to those of 
India, China, Britain, and even Germany and 
the United States. Of course, some of these 
institutions are notorious for handing out 
certificates as diplomatic tokens. However, 
this does not detract from the fact that, in 
many cases, South African military personnel 
who attended these foreign learning oppor-
tunities, returned to South Africa with a for-
mal academic qualification – often a Master’s 
degree in defence or security studies. This 
raises legitimate questions about why this 
cannot be done at the South African profes-
sional military educational institutions.
Thirdly, the 2015 Defence Review is quite 
explicit about the need for accredited 
 military education at the SANDF’s colleges. 
It states bluntly that all military learning 
activities “will be accredited within the NQF 
[National Qualifications Framework] and 
adhere to the requirements of the South 
African Qualifications Authority (SAQA)” 
(Department of Defence and Military 
Veterans 2015). In addition, it is noted, the 
SANDF must “partner its military profes-
sional education with existing programmes 
at universities and other institutions of 
higher learning and ensure accreditation of 
its own training programmes” (Department 
of Defence and Military Veterans 2015). The 
Defence Review also requires the SANDF 
to ensure “an appropriate balance between 
an in-house training capacity and the out- 
sourcing of education to institutions of 
higher learning”. Thus, the Defence Review 
gives recognition to the fact that the SANDF 
can train on its own but needs outside assis-
tance in the provision of education. The need 
for partnerships with recognised institutions 
of higher learning for quality education is 
thus recognised (Department of Defence 
and Military Veterans 2015). The Defence 
Review is also prescriptive in terms of the 
different levels of education and training 
in the SANDF. This ought to begin with the 
Officer Foundational Education and Training 
that “will be founded in a broad-liberal edu-
cation at the Defence Academy and the 
subsequent education, training and devel-
opment programmes within the Defence 
Force” (Department of Defence and Military 
Veterans 2015:X). Thus, from a policy per-
spective the need is recognised for a first 
degree as requirement for entry into the 
officer corps. Of course, the practical reality is 
often far remove from this policy imperative. 
The next level is Junior Command, Warfare 
and Staff Course that ought to be presented 
by the different service colleges, followed 
by the Senior Command, Warfare and Staff 
Course at the War College and culminating at 
the so-called Joint Strategic Studies Course at 
the Defence College (Department of Defence 
and Military Veterans 2015).
Lastly, from a subjective perspective, and 
something that transpired through the nego-
tiation process with the Faculty of Military 
Science and the Defence College, was the 
unspoken need for status, ticket punching 
and bragging rights. Very often it seems as if 
neither the process of education, nor the con-
tent and outcomes thereof, are necessarily of 
extreme importance to the SANDF. Rather, 
the emphasis on the need for education is, 
firstly, on the requirement for access for as 
wide a spectrum of students as possible to 
the educational programme, irrespective of 
whether a student has a first degree or not. 
Stated differently, the SANDF is not necessar-
ily comfortable with academic gatekeeping. 
As is the case to some extent in South African 
society at large, there is little understanding 
for the somewhat elitist nature of academic 
institutions and the inherent discrimination 
against those without the aptitude for higher 
education (see Deresiewicz 2008). Secondly, 
the emphasis on the need for education is on 
throughput – those who enter must gradu-
ate. This is an inherent military mentality; 
higher headquarters expect high pass rates. 
Students are expected to “train” until they 
adhere to the required standard. In the end, 
the primary driver in the need for educa-
tion seems to be the status that is associated 
Esterhuyse and Mokoena: The Need for Progress in an Era of TransformationArt. 6, page 8 of 17
with an advanced degree and not necessar-
ily the knowledge gained nor the attributes 
and advantages that an educated personnel 
corps would bring to the military. There is no 
doubt that the SANDF wants it personnel to 
be educated. Yet, the SANDF is not necessar-
ily comfortable or prepared for the demands 
and kind of attributes, advantages and ben-
efits that educated individuals would bring 
to the institution.
The Supply: Military Research and 
Education at South African Universities
Much of the above discussion has focused on 
the growth in the demand for education from 
within the South African armed forces since 
1994. But, it is necessary to also look at the 
so-called supply side, specifically, the ability 
of the South African universities and other 
educational institutions to assist the South 
African armed forces in its growing demand 
for education. One of the basic  assumptions 
in the discussion of military education is 
rooted in an understanding that interna-
tional relations (IR), security or – more 
specifically – strategic studies, and  military 
history are the cornerstone disciplines in the 
education of armed forces (Infinity Journal 
2016). International relations, and the 
grey areas between international relations, 
African Studies and security in South Africa, 
are vibrant sub-disciplines and fields of 
study in most political science departments 
at South African universities. Most of these 
 universities can provide IR education to the 
military educational institutions.
Research on South African military history 
is done by a number of academics at  various 
universities in South Africa6 and a small num-
ber of scholars abroad.7 There is also a small 
number of independent researchers of mili-
tary history in South Africa that have made 
substantial contributions to the historiog-
raphy of South African wars over the years.8 
The history of the Border War (1967–1989) 
specifically, have recently benefitted from a 
number of autobiographies from individu-
als who participated in that war. Looking at 
the history programmes on offer at South 
African universities, however, it is interest-
ing to note that military history does not 
constitute a key element of many of these 
programmes. A small number of universi-
ties address the causes, progress and impact 
of specific South African wars as part of the 
general history curriculum. However, it is not 
necessarily done against the background of a 
broad outline of the evolution of warfare. The 
Military History Department in the Faculty 
of Military Science of Stellenbosch University 
at the South African Military Academy is, 
thus, somewhat unique in their offering 
of a three-year programme in military his-
tory. Though the department addresses the 
military history of South Africa and Africa 
in general, the primary focus is on the evo-
lution of warfare. The National War College 
also has one residential historian focusing 
on the links between the evolution of war, 
the notion of operational art and the opera-
tional level of war. What is evidenced is that 
while military history is vibrantly researched, 
military history is not readily on offer as part 
of the educational programmes at universi-
ties in South Africa. The military, to a large 
extent, must rely on the Faculty of Military 
Science of Stellenbosch University for a pro-
gramme that has the evolution of warfare as 
its core focus.
Turning to strategic studies as an academic 
discipline, it appears to have been outma-
noeuvred by the new and normatively-driven 
mainstream at civilian universities; in the 
policy field, the absence of good strategic 
thinking is becoming increasingly evident 
(Duyvesteyn and Worrall 2017). In South 
Africa, the study of strategy and research 
on military affairs must consider the impact 
of the broadening and deepening of the 
 security debate and the impact thereof on 
South African universities and research insti-
tutions.9 Whereas South Africa experienced 
a vibrant interest in military affairs in the 
1990s, it is clear that the study of the mili-
tary, strategy and security in South Africa 
has been demilitarised with an emphasis 
on security, instead of strategic, studies. By 
way of example, since 1994 the Institute for 
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Defence Policy has been transformed into the 
Institute for Security Studies, the Department 
of Strategic Studies at the University of South 
Africa was absorbed into the Department 
of Political Sciences now only offering pro-
grammes in politics, African politics and 
international politics, and the Institute 
for Strategic Studies at the University of 
Pretoria has been recast into the Institute 
for Strategic and International Affairs with 
security as an elective in the programmes 
of the Department of Political Sciences. The 
Department of Political Sciences at Pretoria 
University still houses the Strategic Review for 
South Africa, a well-recognised journal in the 
field. However, the journal has broadened its 
scope in order “to facilitate more vigorous and 
enlightened debate among scholars, policy 
makers, practitioners, students and activists, 
to contribute to the wider global discourse 
on the strengthening of democracy, human 
rights, security, good governance and the rule 
of law” (University of Pretoria). It will not be 
wrong to argue that military and strategic 
studies, as an academic discipline, has been 
moved to the periphery of academic interest 
in South Africa, with a subsequent dwindling 
effect on the existing body of knowledge.
In an interesting chapter on insider-
outsider experiences of military research 
in South Africa, Lindy Heinecken recently 
noted that “there has been a marked decline 
in the teaching on military issues in South 
Africa” with a shift from military and defence 
issues to broader human security issues 
and conflict resolution (2016:36). This, 
Heinecken points out, is due to “the histori-
cal and security context, as well as pressures 
stemming from broader society”; that this 
is an issue that is closely linked to the his-
tory of the fight against apartheid and the 
“strong anti-militarist sentiments among 
the English-speaking universities”; and that 
the small number of South African scholars 
that have maintained an interest in military 
affairs are scattered within South African 
universities with a broad research focus on 
issues of regional security, foreign relations 
and peacekeeping (Heinecken 2016:38–39).
Turning to the military environment itself, 
the South African military, before 1994, was 
strongly tactical and operational in orienta-
tion. A well-known South African defence 
commentator at the time, for example, 
argued that the SADF neither read nor wrote 
and “was suffering from mental stagnation” 
(Heitman 1980:48). Since 1994, very few 
officers have engaged in peer reviewed and 
accredited research. Heinecken notes that 
the South African armed forces still con-
sider itself as “men of action” and that anti-
intellectualism is prevalent (2016:40–41). 
Military libraries are totally under-resourced 
and lack the basic reading required for 
scholarly research and debate; there is lit-
tle understanding and appreciation for aca-
demic research. A variety of factors make 
it challenging to engage in research in and 
about the South African armed forces. These 
include restrictions on access to information; 
centralised bureaucratic red tape; political 
sensitivities; and restrictions on publication.
These challenges have resulted in research-
ers relying on desk research and applying 
a degree of self-censorship, whilst teach-
ing and research on strategic and military 
affairs in South Africa has increasing become 
 theoretical and detached from what is 
unfolding in practice (Heinecken 2016:42–
43). Only two universities maintain a focus 
on teaching security, strategic and military 
affairs – the Gauteng-based University of the 
Witwatersrand and Stellenbosch University, 
through its Faculty of Military Science at the 
South African Military Academy.
The Centre of Defence and Security 
Management at the Wits School of 
Governance (WSG) has a one-year post-
graduate diploma aimed at enhancing the 
knowledge and skills of current security 
sector administrators and practitioners. The 
programme targets individuals with work 
experience, who wish to embark on a career 
in the security sector, and equips them with 
the skills needed to become effective public 
administrators and security sector practi-
tioners or enables them to proceed with a 
Master’s degree programme in the field. The 
Esterhuyse and Mokoena: The Need for Progress in an Era of TransformationArt. 6, page 10 of 17
focus is on a sector-wide approach through 
a consideration of the role of institutions 
dealing with public safety, state security and 
defence. Two features of the programme 
ought to be emphasised. Firstly, it is quite 
clear that the programme is more oriented 
towards a wide and more comprehensive 
emphasis on the broad field of security than 
the narrower domain of defence, strate-
gic and military studies (Centre of Defence 
and Security Management 2017). Secondly, 
the defining concept in the programme is 
management as not only reflected in the 
name of the programme but also that the 
programme is located within the domain of 
public management.
The Faculty of Military Science of 
Stellenbosch University, housed at the South 
African Military Academy, is an  interesting 
and strange blend of a wide range of 
 seemingly unrelated disciplines, some of 
which are difficult to link to the field of mili-
tary science and strategic and military stud-
ies. More specifically, the emphasis in the 
programmes is on the provision of a broad 
liberal education and not necessarily a pro-
fessional military education. The Faculty of 
Military Science offers students a wide variety 
of undergraduate degrees, Master of Military 
Science (MMil) and Doctor of Philosophy 
with specialisation in Military Science (PhD) 
programmes in (SU 2017):
•	 Human and organisational development.
•	 Organisation and resource management.
•	 Technology.
•	 Technology and defence management.
•	 Security and Africa studies
Two remarks must be made about the 
 programmes of the Faculty of Military Science. 
Firstly, unlike the post-graduate diploma at 
the University of the Witwatersrand, the pri-
mary focus in the Faculty of Military Science 
is on undergraduate teaching. Only a small 
number of students enrol for the MMil and 
PhD programmes in the Faculty. Secondly, 
graduating with a BMil degree does not mean 
that a student has been introduced to secu-
rity, strategic and military studies. In fact, 
only a small number of students graduating 
with an undergraduate degree are exposed, 
in their three years of study, to the fields of 
military history, strategic studies and interna-
tional politics. The Departments of Political 
Science, Strategy and Military History are 
grouped together in the School for Security 
and Africa Studies.
Facing Reality: Linking Universities 
with the Defence and War Colleges 
in South Africa
The increasing drive for higher education in 
the SANDF resulted in an agreement between 
the National Defence College in Pretoria and 
Stellenbosch University’s Faculty of Military 
Science in 2014 for the delivery of a Master of 
Philosophy (MPhil) in Security Management 
at the Defence College. Consequently, in 
2015, the ENSP at the Defence College was 
replaced by the Security and Defence Studies 
Programme (SDSP). The idea was that the 
MPhil in Security Management should 
 constitute the academic component of the 
SDSP and that the Directing Staff of the 
Defence College (DS) should take care of the 
training elements of the programme.
The first challenge of the SDSP was that 
most of the learners on the programme 
did not qualify for entry into the MPhil in 
Security Management. Most of the  officers in 
the SANDF do not have a first degree as it is 
not an enforced requirement for  officership. 
Military personnel in the SANDF, in many 
cases even the same military rank, rarely 
have similar academic qualifications or expe-
rience, because career pathing is not aligned 
with qualifications in higher education. Thus, 
with the SDSP (as is the case with the rest of 
the organisation) many officers did not have 
the required academic foundation for mas-
ter-level studies at Stellenbosch University. 
Additionally, many officers also did not 
necessarily major in security studies-related 
fields that allowed for easy access into gradu-
ate studies in the specific field. On their part, 
the SANDF further complicated the process 
by obligating some people to do the MPhil 
programme, regardless of personal motiva-
tion and previous educational qualification. 
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As a result, the first compromise of the SDSP 
was to present the programme though a 
parallel two-tier process: one small group of 
learners – those qualifying for registration 
for the MPhil in Security Management – was 
to graduate with both a master’s level degree 
and a certificate from the College on com-
pletion of the SDSP; another larger group of 
learners, largely exposed to the same learn-
ing experience, was to be evaluated in a dif-
ferent manner, and was to graduate with two 
certificates: one from the Faculty of Military 
Science and one from the College.
Thus, alignment and access were prob-
lems from the beginning of the SDSP. One of 
the key issues was that an MPhil in Security 
Management is not aligned with the profile 
of a general in the armed forces. More spe-
cifically, the programme was not designed to 
serve as a graduate programme to prepare 
senior officers for high command. The SDSP 
was a compromise to provide a programme, 
in line with the Defence College curriculum, 
but registered, accredited and available for 
presentation. The SDSP was a means to an 
end – a way to deliver military education 
that also provided opportunity for accredited 
learning. While there were some attempts to 
design a programme more closely based on 
the skills requirements of a senior officer 
preparing to take high command, the SANDF 
has not given significant priority to and 
 support for such efforts.
In addition, a more nuanced discussion 
on the requirements of military education 
must note that higher education does not 
always provide the knowledge and skill-
sets that can be directly linked to everyday 
 military tasks. Conversely, military training 
is always linked with practical everyday mili-
tary tasks. As such, there is often a perceived 
misalignment between higher education and 
the practical needs of the military organisa-
tion. This perceived misalignment, however, 
is often based on the flawed notion that 
 military training can be equated with aca-
demic  education, or that the two have utility 
that can be substituted.
Time was another critical and conten-
tious issue that the SDSP had to contend 
with. The organisation has strict timelines 
about when a course starts and ends and 
what is to be achieved by every member of 
that course within a timeline, with the long-
est period normally being a year. Higher 
education, on the other hand, is based on 
individual performance and flexible time-
lines within the determined terminus of an 
academic programme. The flexible timeline 
allows for the individual to either complete 
within a minimum period, or a maximum 
period. However, the SANDF budgeting 
processes and work responsibilities of per-
sonnel do not always allow for this flexible 
timeline based on individual performance. 
Clashing with the organisation’s notions 
of timelines, the accreditation of academic 
programmes rests on the availability of 
a prescribed  number of notional hours. 
Presenting an MPhil  programme in one year 
is a critical  challenge if all the prescribed 
theoretical modules are to be covered and 
the thesis, that  constitute a large part of the 
programme, is to be  finished. As the military 
then add additional learning programmes to 
the existing schedule, time became a critical 
commodity. The result was that the thesis 
portion was postponed for completion by 
the candidates once they are finished with 
the SDSP at the College. This created two 
immediate challenges. Firstly, it set the scene 
for tension between the academics and the 
DS at the College for time with the students. 
Secondly, commitment was required from 
the students entering the MPhil in Security 
Management having to complete the thesis 
in the year after completion of the SDSP on 
their own time, while working. Of the small 
number of learners who qualified for entry 
into the MPhil in Security Management, an 
even smaller number eventually finished 
their thesis and received their degrees.
Time also revealed another challenge to 
the utilisation and implementation of higher 
education in the SANDF, and this relates to 
higher education versus military training. 
There is a misperception within the organi-
sation, at the extreme, that military training 
alone is sufficient to command and manage 
the organisation. A more commonly held 
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misperception is that military training can 
substitute academic education. The reality is 
that although academic education and mili-
tary training are not mutually exclusive, the 
two are unmistakably distinct, and one can-
not substitute the other. Both are necessary 
for military effectiveness. The constraints 
of time, as aforementioned, pitted the dic-
tates of military training, with the objectives 
of higher education. The requirements of 
higher education and the dictates of train-
ing, thus, must be both, aligned, and clearly 
demarcated.
Technology also presented a real challenge 
– especially since many of the evaluations 
were done through the SUNLearn web-based 
platform of the University. Students also 
had access to academic journals through the 
library website of the University. Though sen-
ior in rank, for many leaners, it was the first 
time that they were required to participate 
in evaluations and research via a web-based 
system. The use of technology was encour-
aged by the Faculty, inter alia, because of the 
physical distance between the location of 
the Faculty of Military Science in Saldanha 
and the Defence College in Pretoria — a road 
distance of about 1500 km. This distance is 
not unique as training and education are 
provided in military units that are geograph-
ically removed from their higher education 
service providers. This presents various chal-
lenges, though, including higher costs and 
increased personnel requirements. There 
is, however, experience in interactive tele-
matic education (ITE) where tuition can be 
provided in real-time, technologically-medi-
ated contact modes to mitigate, and even 
remove, the impediments of geographical 
distance.
Geography also affected the relationship 
between the academics of the Faculty and 
the DS at the College. The role of the DS at 
the Defence College had to change, and this 
was accompanied by resistance and discom-
fort. Whereas the DS had full control over the 
content and presentation of the ENSP at the 
Defence College, they had to relinquish con-
trol of the academic component of the SDSP 
to the Faculty. This was even more of a prob-
lem because, as was alluded to earlier, the 
MPhil in Security Management did not align 
seamlessly with what was previously pre-
sented as part of the ENSP. The DS at the col-
leges have military training expertise that are 
not always transferable in higher education, 
often setting them on a collision course with 
higher education service providers. In addi-
tion, the DS had to play a supporting role to 
academics that were often their juniors in 
terms of military rank. Instead of collegial 
relations developing between the DS and 
the academic, on some occasions, it turned 
adversarial. The military training expertise 
of the DS are, however, indispensable when 
linking the requirements of military train-
ing with the outcomes of higher education. 
Thus, the role of DS staff needs to be clearly 
defined, and they need to be capacitated to 
support higher education service providers, 
and to play the critical role of aligning the 
needs of military training and the outcomes 
of higher education.
Everyone that was involved in the project 
understood that this was a pilot project that 
would bring certain challenges to the fore 
and would require fine-tuning. However, 
towards the end of 2015, a decision was made 
to terminate the involvement of the Faculty 
of Military Science in the SDSP, and for the 
University of the Witwatersrand to deliver 
the SDSP. This was a surprise to the Faculty 
of Military Science and the members of the 
Faculty that were involved in the teaching at 
the Defence College. The decision to termi-
nate the Faculty of Military Science’s involve-
ment at the Defence College was taken in 
haste; it was to a large extent based on per-
sonalised decision-making and it was not 
part of a bigger vision for higher education in 
the SANDF. Cultural clashes between the DS 
and academic staff, coupled with the incon-
venient geography, strained inter-personal 
relations and undermined the initial effort. 
However, the Faculty of Military Science con-
tinues to be an important role player and by 
2017 had been approached by the Defence 
College for renewed involvement in the 
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SDSP; the War College in Pretoria has also 
approached the Faculty for the  presentation 
of Post Graduate Diploma in Defence 
Studies (PGDDS).
The decision to terminate the involvement 
of the Faculty of Military Science in the SDSP 
reveals the oscillation between personalised 
decision-making and collective decision-
making that the SANDF experiences. On the 
one hand, collective decision-making leads 
to group-think, which stifles innovation and 
forward-thinking, and ends in self-decep-
tion. Challenges are glossed-over, and self- 
reflection is censored. On the other hand, 
personalised decision-making has detrimen-
tal results, including irrational decision-
making. The end-result of both collective 
decision-making and personalised decision 
is that there is no unity of effort, and there 
is no maintenance of the aim. This lack of 
unity of effort and maintenance of the aim 
is evidenced, not only by the decision on 
the involvement of the Faculty of Military 
Science in the SDSP, and the oscillation 
regarding using one university to another as 
higher education services provides, but by 
other factors, including the lack of actionable 
and enforceable policy regarding  mandatory 
higher education qualifications for different 
rank structures.
Lastly, the biggest challenge facing the 
implementation of higher education in 
the SANDF, and specifically at the War and 
Defence Colleges, is the disjuncture between 
expressed aspirations and the requisite 
inputs. There is some recognition within the 
SANDF that higher education makes an indis-
pensable contribution to the effectiveness 
of such a complex organisation. However, 
this aspiration is not adequately resourced. 
This under-resourcing ranges from person-
nel requirements to funding, infrastructure 
and technology. The under-resourcing of the 
War and Defence Colleges has led them to 
rely on outside support from South African 
academic and civil society institutions as 
well as from the British military, who still 
maintain a training support presence at the 
peacekeeping training centre in Pretoria, and 
other international partners. The Faculty of 
Military Science, for their part, have designed 
academic programmes for various institu-
tions of the SANDF. Further undermining the 
education efforts, are that most personnel 
study part-time, and juggle professional and 
personal commitments with their studies. 
The military does not provide learners with 
adequate time and the requisite resources 
and support to enable part-time study for 
adult-learners.
Conclusions
The defence sector in South Africa has been 
radically reformed since democratisation 
in 1994. The transformation of the military 
relied heavily on racial representation as 
the key indicator of defence sector reform. 
Given the political changes in South Africa, 
the history of the armed forces, and the 
changes in the global and African strategic 
realities at the time, such an emphasis was 
expected and, indeed, necessary. However, 
the transformation process also impacted on 
the effectiveness of the armed forces. This 
 situation was exacerbated by a substantial 
cut in the defence budget and a weapons 
procurement process that was not aligned 
with the strategic needs of the country and 
riddled by corruption. The result was a grow-
ing misalignment between missions and 
capabilities within the armed forces and the 
SANDF, as an institution, seen to be in a seri-
ous state of decline. The policy frameworks 
made provision for education to bring about 
transformation and addressed the issue of 
military effectiveness. However, that was 
easier said than done.
The debate on the role of education in 
the transformation and effectiveness of the 
armed forces was increasingly bureaucra-
tised and focused on the role of the National 
Defence and the National War Colleges in 
Pretoria. The programmes at both institu-
tions were critical in shaping the thinking of 
the future defence leadership as well as shap-
ing the strategic narratives of the personnel 
in the SANDF and the strategic realities of 
the country. However, neither of the two 
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programmes were accredited with an insti-
tution of higher learning and participation 
could not be translated into an academic 
qualification on completion. This need for 
academic accreditation became a critical 
issue for the SANDF. Efforts to align the pro-
grammes of these institutions turned out to 
be more problematic than expected.
Part of the difficulty of alignment between 
the military and academic institutions had 
to do with the fact that security and, more 
specifically, strategic studies have become a 
marginalised discipline within the  university 
sector in South Africa. However, the more 
critical issues seemed to be that defence 
 personnel in South Africa are not required to 
have a first degree for entry into the officer 
corps and that the SANDF is not comfortable 
with the notion of gatekeeping by  universities 
for entry into the graduate  programmes. This 
is augmented by questions about the time 
balance between training and education, the 
control over the programmes, and the financ-
ing thereof.
Notes
 1 The notion of “higher education” is 
used in South Africa to describe tertiary 
 education, in general, and at universities, 
in particular.
 2 The Minister of Defence and Military 
Veterans provides an overview of the 
challenges facing the military in her 
budget speeches. See the 2017 budget 
speech (Ministry of Defence and Military 
Veterans 2017).
 3 This is in stark contrast, for example, 
with South Africa’s military  intervention 
in Lesotho under the umbrella of SADC 
in September in 1998. In the case of 
Operation Boleas, Prof Theo Neethling 
from the Centre for Military Studies 
was tasked to do an in-depth analysis 
and after-action report of South Africa’s 
military involvement in Lesotho. See, for 
example, Neethling (1999).
 4 See the following two documents for an 
outline of the accreditation of academic 
qualifications in South Africa: DoE 2008 
and SAQA 2012.
 5 See Van Creveld 1990 for an elaborate 
discussion of this phenomenon.
 6 Profs Andre Wessels and Leopold Scholtz 
at the University of the Free State in 
Bloemfontein and Prof Fransjohan 
Pretorius and Dr Jackie Grobler at Pretoria 
University are the most prominent in 
this regard. One should also include the 
research of the Faculty of Military Science 
from Stellenbosch University in this 
regard. Prof Ian van der Waag’s seminal 
work A Military History of Modern South 
Africa ought to be mentioned.
 7 These include, amongst others, Prof John 
Laband, Professor Emeritus at Wilfrid 
Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, 
Canada and Prof Tim Stapleton of the 
Department of History at the University 
of Calgary in Canada.
 8 The names of people like Dr Louis Bothma 
and Piet Nortje should be  mentioned in 
this regard.
 9 For a more in-depth discussion in this 
regard see Esterhuyse (2016).
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